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ABSTRACT
From a corporate governance point of view, this paper addresses
the question of how corporate ownership and board characteris-
tics influence firm value for a sample of Ibero-American compa-
nies. Specifically, we analyse indexed non-financial companies
from Chile and Spain for the period 2007 – 2016, using the GMM
panel data technique. Our research is novel in considering a two-
country approach, with one emerging and one developed country,
and in analysing how corporate ownership and board characteris-
tics, in addition to contextual variables, determine firm value. Our
results assess the efficiency of corporate governance mechanisms.
Although findings are intriguing regarding ownership concentra-
tion, they confirm the benefits of a good board of directors. This
type of board is characterised by a large size, sufficiently inde-
pendent directors, and a balance in terms of gender diversity. We
provide several policy recommendations from our main findings.
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1. Introduction
It is generally accepted that corporate governance refers to the various ways in which
suppliers of funds ensure that their capital is intelligently and efficiently managed
(Aguilera & Crespi-Cladera, 2016). Thus, regulation and codes of corporate govern-
ance are not an end in themselves, but a means to support protection of property
rights, economic efficiency, sustainable growth and financial stability (Hai, Roig-
Dobon, & Sanchez-Garcıa, 2016).1
Financial literature on governance structures in emerging markets has confirmed
that these mechanisms do not behave as they do in developed economies, such as the
USA and other Anglo-Saxon countries (Claessens, Djankov, Fan, & Lang, 2002;
Claessens & Yurtoglu, 2013; De Jong, Kabir, & Nguyen, 2008; Klapper & Love, 2004).
Various scandals occurring in different corporations around the world in the past
few years have highlighted the inefficiency of corporate governance mechanisms in
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preventing damage to firm value (Saona & Muro, 2018). Consequently, there is an
increasing interest in academia and the general public concerning corporate govern-
ance issues (Claessens & Yurtoglu, 2013), specifically how these mechanisms impact
firm value (Durnev & Kim, 2005) as well as on how the development of the financial
markets shapes the efficiency of these governance systems (Millar, Eldomiaty, Choi, &
Hilton, 2005).
Given that financial stability can suffer the consequences of a lack of good govern-
ance, as evidenced by the financial recessions that occurred in Russia, Asia, and
Brazil (Claessens & Yurtoglu, 2013), more recent research has highlighted the relative
importance that good corporate governance has for countries as a tool to boost finan-
cial development that triggers economic growth and increases firm value (Ang, Cole,
& Lin, 2000; Beck & Levine, 2004; Claessens & Yurtoglu, 2013; Harris & Raviv, 1991;
Jensen, 1986; Setia-Atmaja, 2009). Dyck and Zingales (2004) echo these arguments,
confirming that investors are willing to pay a premium for well-governed and con-
trolled firms. Similarly, Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2007) mention that the scandals
at corporate or political levels reinforce the need to study the effects that corporate
governance mechanisms have on firm value.
Market regulators have issued new legal frameworks in response to a lack of effi-
cient governance systems, like the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the US in 2002 (Gillan &
Martin, 2007) to anticipate corporate scandals, and as a means of establishing and
regulating corporate practices that impact firm value (Roe, 2003). Therefore, the
demand for third-party governance services keeps increasing by providing, for
instance, indexes on the quality of the governance practices of publicly listed firms
(Bozec & Bozec, 2012).
This paper focusses on two specific aspects of corporate governance that influence
firm value. First, we consider corporate-level governance features, such as the owner-
ship structure and the characteristics of the board of directors. Second, we consider
institutional-level features that might impact firm value in a different way depending
on the efficiency of the country’s legal framework. In doing so, we consider listed
companies of comparable but different institutional environments of Chile and Spain.
Chile and Spain, as civil-law countries, have similarities and differences that might
affect firm value unevenly. For instance, Chile is an emerging economy in South
America, whose companies are characterised by a high level of ownership concentra-
tion, even beyond what is necessary to exercise control. Moreover, many of the
Chilean companies are affiliated with a limited number of business groups (Farıas,
2014).2 Additionally, Chile is one of the few countries in the world with the obliga-
tion by law to distribute dividends, in this case, at least 30.0% of annual profits
(Maquieira & Danus, 1998). Likewise, the Chilean pension system is managed by pri-
vate companies called pension fund administrators (AFPs by its acronym in Spanish)
who are important institutional investors in the financial market. These pension man-
agers act not only as bondholders but also as shareholders, with the ability to appoint
a director to the board of directors (Jara, Lopez-Iturriaga, San Martın, Saona, &
Tenderini, 2019). Hence, these pension managers as institutional investors play a
major role in the governance systems of Chilean companies. On the other hand,
Spain, a developed European country, also has significant levels of ownership
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concentration–like other civil-law countries (de Miguel, Pindado, & de la Torre,
2004; Lopez & Saona, 2007). The corporate governance of listed companies in Spain
is primarily regulated by the standard compulsory corporate legislation and by a
corporate governance code, the recommendations of which are generally addressed
to listed companies and may be followed voluntarily (Garcıa Martın & Herrero,
2018; Paredes & Nu~nez-Lagos, 2015). Its main characteristic is voluntariness, subject
to the ‘comply and explain’ principle. The Spanish Unified Good Governance Code
of Listed Companies adopts modern trends in corporate practices, stated by differ-
ent entities and institutions such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD), the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, and the
European Commission, and it considers the comments and proposals put forth by
economic operators and institutions. Although its recommendations are voluntary,
the concepts and definitions of the Unified Code are compulsory, and each listed
company must explain its level of compliance with its provisions annually. The
Unified Code shares the international standards that characterise the recommenda-
tions on good governance practices.
Hence, the goal of this paper is to analyse the potential impact that ownership struc-
ture and board characteristics, as corporate governance mechanisms, have on corporate
value in the context of Chile and Spain.3 The lack of research on both countries in the
existing literature on corporate governance mechanisms and their impact on firm value
makes the comparative analysis invaluable. Additionally, there are many reasons that
make the comparative analysis an appealing contribution to the literature. First, our
interest is to break down the paradigm of the empirical literature focussed on firms of
countries that follow the common-law legal framework, such as the US and the UK
(Hermalin & Weisbach, 1991; Owen & Temesvary, 2018). Hence, we wanted to include
two economies that belong to the same legal system, in this case the civil-law, banking-
oriented system, but operate in two different regional contexts, South America and
Europe. Second, we echo Saona (2011) in recognising the homogeneity of the financial
markets of the countries under analysis which makes them an appealing group to be
subject to empirical study. Third, another similarity is a comparable overall growth
rate during the period of analysis that mitigates estimation biases. Fourth, compara-
tively speaking, both countries have experienced significant integration of their finan-
cial markets in their respective geographic contexts. On the one hand, after the
banking crisis in Chile at the beginning of the 80 s, companies were gradually allowed
to issue equity capital domestically as well as in the foreign markets, primarily in the
United States and other South American countries (Fernandez, 2005). On the other
hand, Spain was urged to reduce its international trade barriers by becoming part of
European Union, substantially increasing the flow of international capital (Saona,
2011). Hence, both countries have been exposed to comparable economic integration
processes. Finally, regarding their corporate governance systems, both countries have
adopted and developed internal governance tools such as highly concentrated owner-
ship structures and sizable boards of directors (Saona & Vallelado, 2010), on top of
their shared culture, historical background, and economic interdependence. Therefore,
the study of companies of both countries together constitutes a pioneering research in
the field of corporate governance and firm value.
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Our results concerning the characteristics of ownership structure show a clear
asymmetric impact of the ownership concentration as well as the managerial owner-
ship on firm value between Chilean and Spanish companies. This finding is import-
ant because in one institutional context the ownership structure enhances firm value
and in the other it erodes it. Additionally, board of directors’ features are key mecha-
nisms for influencing the value of the firm and in reducing managerial misbehaviour.
Policy recommendations will be derived from the main findings.
The paper proceeds as follows. In addition to this introductory section, the next sec-
tion summarises the literature review and develops the research hypotheses. Section 3
describes the methodology used in the empirical analysis. Section 4 discusses the empir-
ical results and finally, in Section 5, we underline the major conclusions.
2. Literature review and hypotheses
2.1. Chile and Spain as comparable institutional contexts
Regarding the corporate governance structures in Chile and Spain, it has been widely
recognised that Chile has suffered dramatic consequences from corporate scandals
(Gephart, 2016; Silva, 2016). For example, Penta Group, one of Chile’s largest holding
companies, was investigated in 2014 for directing funds to the right-wing UDI party’s
campaign coffers, and evading taxes while doing so. The mining giant SQM, which
controls most of Chile’s lithium production, is another remarkable example of weak
governance. Investigators found that for years SQM has financed the campaigns of
presidential candidates from parties across the political spectrum. In addition, there is
the La Polar case, in which the managers colluded with some of the board members,
carrying out accounting manipulation practices. When the case became public
through the media, La Polar shares fell 42.0%, decreasing the company’s market cap-
italisation by US$670 million in a single day. This involved a loss of US$350 million
to La Polar’s minority institutional investors with the subsequent significant erosion
of the firm value.
The current corporate governance framework in Chile goes back to 1981 when
two laws were enacted: The Corporations Law and The Securities Market Law, which
were amended several times (Jara et al., 2019). The new Corporate Governance Law
was signed on October 2009. It strengthened the protection of minority shareholders
through enhanced transparency standards and mechanisms for addressing the use of
privileged information, insider transactions and conflicts of interest, through provi-
sions to improve the definition of independent directors and to strengthen their role
in reviewing sensitive issues relevant to minority shareholder protection through the
board of directors’ committees.
Spain has also suffered the consequences of corporate scandals like Pescanova,
Bankia, and Afinsa, among many others (Saona, Muro, & Alvarado, 2020). In the
specific case of Bankia, the political party UPyD in 2012 presented a lawsuit before
the High Court of Spain against the managers of Bankia for alleged crimes of fraud,
misappropriation, falsification of financial statements in connection with corporate
crimes, fraudulent administration, and attempts to alter the price of their assets. As
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in the Chilean corporate sector, these corporate scandals brought about a subsequent
loss of share value.
The comparative analysis between Chile and Spain will shed light on how corpor-
ate governance mechanisms affect firm value in two economies where research has
been relatively neglected. These two economies also present similarities that make
this an attractive study. Both countries belong to the French civil-law legal system
and therefore have weak legal protection for minority investors (La Porta, Lopez-De-
Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1998). Anderson and Gupta (2009), with a multi-country
analysis, found that the joint effect of a country’s financial structure and legal system
does matter when explaining the relationship between performance and the overall
level of corporate governance in a given country. Furthermore, according to La Porta,
Lopez-De-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999) and La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer, and
Vishny (2002), the development of the financial structure of a country will be deter-
mined by its legal setting. In this respect, Chilean and Spanish financial structures are
based in the bank-oriented model. La Porta et al. (1998) emphasised that financial
development promotes economic growth. According to this, both countries present
similarities in the sense that they are considered as high-income economies according
to the World Bank, are part of the OECD, and present a very high level of human
development according to the United Nation Human Development Index. In terms
of economic interdependence, Spain is one of the top 10 trading partners with Chile.4
Both countries present concentrated ownership structures (insider systems) which
generate conflicts of interests between majority (controlling) and weak minority
shareholders (Saona, 2011; Saona & Vallelado, 2010).
Most of the literature on corporate governance assumes dispersed ownership as
the main reason for the agency conflicts between managers and shareholders
(Claessens, Djankov, & Lang, 2000). Nevertheless, contrary to the findings of Berle
and Means (1932), empirical evidence has demonstrated that not all the institutional
contexts exhibit dispersed ownership, and that in many cases, it can be even difficult
to find (Klapper & Love, 2004; Klein, Shapiro, & Young, 2005). La Porta et al. (1999)
emphasised that it is not common to find economies with dispersed corporate owner-
ship, except in those with strong shareholder protection and developed capital mar-
kets, and in general, where firms are controlled by government or families through
pyramidal structures. For instance, Lefort and Walker (2007) concluded that in the
case of high ownership concentration, such as in the Chilean and Spanish cases, the
most pervasive agency conflict in the firm is between controlling shareholders and
minority shareholders (i.e., the horizontal agency problem).
Regarding the institutional factors, both countries rank similarly in the different
dimensions of the World Governance Indicator for 2016, except for the control of
corruption, in which Chile outperformed Spain. The effectiveness of governance sys-
tems is influenced by differences in the countries’ legal and regulatory frameworks,
historical and cultural factors, and also the structure of product and factor markets
(Maher & Andersson, 1999). In the specific case of Chile and Spain, both countries
present similarities in their legal systems, and their economies and show a certain
level of economic interdependence as well as presenting differences in the factors that
determine their corporate governance systems. Regarding corruption perception,
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Leon, Ara~na, and de Leon (2013) stated that corruption levels in these two countries
perform differently in the assessments of the Transparency International Corruption
Perception Index, but have rapidly increased the organisation of public services and
the level of development in recent decades. Additionally, Leon et al. (2013) main-
tained that the Chilean Administration is one of the most effective public administra-
tions in Latin America, wherein a series of initiatives have been implemented to
strengthen transparency, making it comparable to the Spanish context. Finally, as is
well known, both countries share cultural, historic, and economic backgrounds which
makes it easier to control for particularities at the national level that could potentially
affect the efficiency of governance mechanisms on firm value.
2.2. Corporate governance and firm value
Scholarly research about corporate governance is deeply rooted in the agency
approach, which is the theoretical body that studies the conflict of interests in corpo-
rations caused by the different incentives between the contractual parties (Benavides-
Espinosa & Roig-Dobon, 2011; Berle & Means, 1932; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). This
conflict of interests highlights the necessity to implement mechanisms that encourage
managers to behave in the best interest of shareholders.
Claessens and Yurtoglu (2013) and Vander Bauwhede (2009) broadly defined cor-
porate governance as those mechanisms concerned with the resolution of collective
action problems among dispersed investors and the reconciliation of conflicts of
interest between various corporate claimholders. Similarly, Zingales (1998)’s approach
to corporate governance defined it as a set of contracts that determines the rights on
the cash flows generated by the firm. This author indicates that this definition is set
on the way these cash flows are generated and distributed, taking into consideration
that all corporate governance mechanisms should be included in this definition. In
the same line, Kumari and Pattanayak (2014) referred to corporate governance from
a more traditional point of view as the set of systems that ensures a company is prop-
erly managed in the best interest of stakeholders.
As the goal of this paper is to examine the impact of corporate governance mecha-
nisms from a two-country perspective, we must extend the definition to include rules
and institutions. In this respect, our goal is better approached through the definition
of corporate governance mechanisms that Shleifer and Vishny (1997) provided,
viewed from a wider perspective, suggesting that governance refers to the economic
and legal institutions that can be altered through political process. They also stated
that corporate governance deals with the ways in which financiers of corporations
assure themselves of earning a return on their investment. As observed, this defin-
ition is linked to the agency approach. In the same line, Saona and San Martın
(2016) defined corporate governance as a set of internally and externally generated
mechanisms (e.g., procedures, policies, rules, norms, and institutions, among others)
through which firms operate when ownership is separated from management to
ensure the maximisation of shareholders’ wealth.
There is vast empirical and theoretical evidence about the impact that corporate
governance mechanisms have on firm value. For instance, Millar et al. (2005)
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indicated that investors will offer their funds to those corporations that, being
aware of their incomplete contracts, show efficient corporate governance mechanisms.
Klapper and Love (2004) found evidence that firm-level corporate governance provi-
sions are more important in countries with weak legal environments. Durnev and
Kim (2005) found that the quality of governance and disclosure practices are related
positively to firm valuation, and this relation is stronger in weak legal regimes.
Considering macroeconomic shocks, Baek, Kang, and Suh Park (2004) found that
changes in firm value during a crisis is a function of firm-level differences in corpor-
ate governance measures. Consequently, there are many corporate governance factors
that explain firm value across countries. Some factors are determined at the firm level
whilst others are defined at the country or institutional level (Hechavarrıa, 2016;
Stewart, 2018).
2.3. Corporate ownership features and firm value
The literature suggests that ownership structure features bring alternative incentives
to monitor a firm’s management and to align the interests between the principal and
the agents (Ang et al., 2000; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Morck, Shleifer, & Vishny,
1988; Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). Jensen and Meckling (1976) hypothesised that manag-
ers may act according to their own self-interest when the firm’s control and owner-
ship structure is diluted. In the same vein, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) found that a
high ownership concentration would be effective to solve agency problems only if
there is strong investor protection. However, there is an alternative justification to an
inverse relation between concentration of the ownership and firm value. In this
respect, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argued that in some institutional contexts the
agency problem comes from the conflict between controlling owners and minority
shareholders –the type II or horizontal agency problem– instead of between managers
and dispersed shareholders, also known as type I or the vertical agency problem.
According to de Miguel et al. (2004) large shareholdings are costly under the hori-
zontal agency problem, because majority owners can redistribute wealth from other
minority shareholders, whose interests need not coincide. This is known as the expro-
priation agency problem and erodes firm value.
These arguments suggest that interaction between the monitoring and the expro-
priation hypotheses justifies a non-linear relationship between the concentration of
the ownership structure and firm value. In this case, the monitoring approach
becomes relevant when there are no significant differences between the interests of
the majority shareholder and managers, meaning that firm value is enhanced with
ownership concentration. Conversely, the expropriation approach indicates that when
concentration of ownership is beyond the optimal level to exercise efficient monitor-
ing, entrenched shareholders will look for their individual benefits by expropriating
the wealth of minority shareholders, with a subsequent deterioration of firm value
(Bae, Baek, Kang, & Liu, 2012). Therefore, according to these arguments, firm value
shrinks as the ownership structure gets more concentrated.
In the same line, La Porta et al. (1999) documented that ownership concentration
correlates with the level of outside shareholders’ legal protection. Two arguments
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support this association. The first one emphasises a substitution view, arguing that
limited shareholder protection increases moral hazard in firms and consequently large
blockholders are required to mitigate that risk (La Porta et al., 1998). Hence, block-
holders serve as a substitute for weak legal protection of minority shareholders and
increases firm value. The alternative approach offers a complementary view, arguing
that under weak legal constraints, blockholders collude with the management in order
to appropriate corporate resources and enjoy private benefits, with a subsequent dilu-
tion in firm value (Rapp & Trinchera, 2017). Hence, both alternative views may justify
a non-unidirectional relationship between firm value and ownership concentration.
Regarding the institutional context, the major Chilean conglomerates record an
ownership control of more than 70.0% of non-financial listed companies in the coun-
try. In fact, according to the OECD’s 2017 Corporate Governance Factbook, the
median controller holds 67.0% of shares, while less than 1.0% of firms are widely
held when applying the threshold of 10.0% of ownership.
In the Spanish context, among IBEX-35 listed companies (25.5% of the total) there
is a controlling shareholder that holds most voting rights. In 91 other listed compa-
nies (66.0% of the total), the sum of declared significant shareholdings, including
shareholdings held by board members, exceeds 50.0% of share capital, without any
individual shareholder exercising control, according to the National Stock Exchange
Commission (CNMV, 2015). OECD records show a high level of ownership concen-
tration in both countries, but more prominently in the case of Chile. Therefore,
regarding corporate ownership concentration, it is very plausible that both competing
hypotheses, the monitoring and the expropriation approach, are observed in the con-
text of the Chilean and Spanish corporate sectors. Consequently, we suggest the fol-
lowing hypothesis:
H1: A non-monotonic, inverse U-shaped relationship is expected between corporate
ownership concentration and firm value, ceteris paribus.
Regarding the managerial ownership, Jensen and Meckling (1976) argued that con-
vergence of interest exists between managers and outside shareholders when insider
shareholdings increase. This convergence leads to lower agency costs and, conse-
quently, higher firm value. Later, Morck et al. (1988) and McConnell and Servaes
(1990) refined such arguments, suggesting that at low levels of closely held shares
there is an alignment of interests between managers and shareholders. However, an
entrenchment effect may be observed in the highest levels of insider ownership
(Qiang & Warfield, 2005). In this situation, managers can use their decision-making
power in their own interest at the expense of shareholders’ wealth. Similarly, Ang
et al. (2000) emphasised that agency costs are higher when an outsider manages the
firm, and that these costs vary inversely with the manager’s ownership share and
increase with the number of non-manager shareholders. This suggests a non-linear
relationship between the managerial ownership concentration and firm value.
Empirically, Morck et al. (1988) found that market value increases with manage-
ment ownership, but it also decreases at high levels of managerial ownership, justify-
ing a non-monotonic relationship between management ownership and market
valuation of the firm. More recently, Lozano, Martınez, and Pindado (2016) found
that when the main owner has effective control over the firm, the relation between
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ownership concentration and firm value is also non-linear. Therefore, the intertwin-
ing of the convergence of interests’ approach and the entrenchment arguments sug-
gests that there is a non-linear relationship between insider ownership and firm value
as stated in the following hypothesis:
H2: A non-monotonic, inverse U-shaped relationship is expected between insider
ownership and firm value, ceteris paribus.
2.4. Board features and firm value
According to the OECD-G20 Principles of Corporate Governance, the corporate gov-
ernance framework should ensure the strategic guidance of the company, the effective
monitoring of management by the board, and the board’s accountability to the com-
pany and shareholders.5 In this regard, the board of directors is considered as the
authority with more power in corporations, and as a fundamental pillar within the
mechanisms of corporate governance, due to its key role in the supervision and con-
trol of the company (Coles & Hesterly, 2000; Gillan, 2006; Lefort & Urzua, 2008).
Boards have the responsibility to monitor management and to protect stakeholders’
interest, reducing agency conflicts between the principal and the agent (Bertoni,
Meoli, & Vismara, 2014; de Andres & Vallelado, 2008).6 However, there is concern
about the board’s incapacity to guarantee that the management acts in the interest of
stakeholders, questioning its role due to the latest financial scandals (Harris & Raviv,
2008). With this in mind, next we develop the research hypotheses derived from the
board features that are key in impacting firm value.
2.4.1. Board size
Generally, the literature that deals with corporate governance measures the effective-
ness of the board of directors in its role of supervising and advising the administra-
tion, based on the different characteristics they have (Coles & Hesterly, 2000; de
Andres & Vallelado, 2008; Raheja, 2005). For instance, Nguyen, Locke, and Reddy
(2015) indicated that the effectiveness of the board of directors is based on its size.
Smaller boards of directors will probably be able to make decisions more actively,
efficiently, and in a timelier manner, and this could translate to better company
results (Eisenberg, Sundgren, & Wells, 1998). This implies that smaller board size
might be more functional and effective as a monitoring system and in providing bet-
ter financial reporting oversight (Karamanou & Vafeas, 2005; Xie, Davidson, &
DaDalt, 2003).
On the other hand, larger boards of directors have the advantage of allowing more
members to join, thus allowing more diversity (i.e., representativeness), and more
information on factors that affect the firm. As Zahra and Pearce (1989) emphasised,
larger boards are more difficult to manipulate. As such, the total number of board
members is used to represent the extent to which the board decisions are not influ-
enced by insiders’ interest (Nguyen, Rahman, Tong, & Zhao, 2016; Raheja, 2005).
Anderson and Reeb (2004) indicated that investors believe that the larger boards of
directors, the better the financial accounting structures of the firm, because they are
better controlled, and therefore experience a reduction in the cost of borrowing.
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Civil-law countries are characterised by the development of internal corporate gov-
ernance systems in which the size of the board tends to be greater than in common-
law regimes (Kumar & Zattoni, 2014). Around the world, several legal initiatives have
taken place to prevent excessively small boards. For instance, regarding the particular-
ities of the institutional framework, the Chilean Corporations Law 18,046 requires a
minimum size of the board of directors of five members and in the case of large
companies, this requirement increases to seven members. The Spanish Companies
Act requires three members minimum, but the Good Governance Code of listed com-
panies recommends at least five. The average number of members for 2016 was 11
showing a slight decrease in the last 10 years. All these measures concerning board
size are designed to increase the number of participants in key corporate decisions.
Based on these arguments, we propose the following hypothesis:
H3: The size of the board of directors will positively impact firm value, whilst all other
variables remain constant.
2.4.2. Board gender
In the recent years, gender diversity has attracted the interest of not only the aca-
demic world but also the business world (Aragon-Mendoza, Raposo, & Roig-Dobon,
2016; McGuinness, Vieito, & Wang, 2019). Research related to economics and psych-
ology in general finds that women are more risk averse and more cautious than men
in their financial decisions (Byrnes, Miller, & Schafer, 1999). According to Gul,
Srinidhi, and Ng (2011), board gender diversity could improve the quality of board
discussions and increase the ability of the board to provide better oversight of a firm’s
disclosures and financial reporting with subsequent improvement of firm value. There
is plenty of literature that positively associates board gender diversity and corporate
performance (Carter, D’Souza, Simkins, & Simpson, 2010; Madanoglu, 2018; Reguera-
Alvarado, de Fuentes, & Laffarga, 2017). For instance, Gavious, Segev, and Yosef
(2012) provided evidence of a negative relationship between the presence of female
directors and earnings management. They concluded that the gender of directors has
value implications for analysts and investors, suggesting that there is a positive rela-
tionship between the proportion of female directors and firm value. These results are
supported by the unique characteristics of women with regard to business ethics and
risk aversion, as discussed earlier, and by findings regarding women’s motivation and
achievement, moral values, social stereotypes and the relation between task perform-
ance and self-confidence (Gul, Fung, & Jaggi, 2009; Srinidhi, Gul, & Tsui, 2011).
Additionally, Francoeur, Labelle, and Sinclair-Desgagne (2007) found that firms oper-
ating in complex environments generate positive and significant abnormal returns
when they have a high proportion of women officers. Similarly, other studies high-
light the benefits of diversity, showing that diverse groups are more innovative
(Chattopadhyay & Duflo, 2004).
The Global Gender Gap Report, developed by the World Economic Forum, bench-
marks 149 countries on their progress towards gender parity across four thematic
dimensions: economic participation and opportunity, educational attainment, health
and survival, and political empowerment. For the year 2018, Chile ranked 54 out of
149 economies in terms of global gender gap, where position 1 represents the most
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parity in the index. In terms of economic participation and opportunity of female
representatives, Chile is ranked 120 out of 149 countries, whilst Spain occupies the
29th position. According to the OCDE statistics for 2016, female share of seats on
boards of the largest publicly listed Chilean companies was 4.7%, and in Spain this
percentage rises to 20.0%. As suggested by recent academic literature, including more
women on boards could bring benefits to corporations in terms of economic value
(Kagzi & Guha, 2018). Therefore, we propose the following hypothesis:
H4: Everything else constant, increasing the presence of female board members in the
board of directors will positively impact firm value.
2.4.3. Board independence
Agency theory suggests that a greater proportion of independent directors will be
able to monitor any self-interested actions by managers (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen
& Meckling, 1976). As a result of the monitoring, there will be fewer opportunities
for managers to pursue self-interest at the expense of owners (low level of agency
costs), and so shareholders will enjoy greater returns, or increased profits. Consistent
with the agency theory, research has found that independent directors are key in solv-
ing expropriation problems suffered by minority shareholders, which enhances firm
value (Anderson & Gupta, 2009; Letza, Sun, & Kirkbride, 2004; Raheja, 2005).
Westphal (1998) suggested that independent directors can play an important role in
mitigating the expropriation risk of minority shareholders by controlling shareholders
among closely-held firms.
Gaur, Bathula, and Singh (2015) indicated that a large part of countries’ corporate
governance policies emphasises the effectiveness of the board, specifically an increase
in the number of independent directors, in order to better supervise the company.
The empirical evidence indicates that a greater degree of board independence implies
greater efficiency in the supervisory role towards senior management, which translates
into fewer conflicts of interest, and therefore generates an increase in the value of the
company (Coles & Hesterly, 2000; Dalton & Dalton, 2005). Anderson and Reeb
(2004) added that independent directors are a defence mechanism that prevents
controlling shareholders from increasing their wealth at the expense of minority
shareholders. Aligned with this idea, Baysinger and Butler (1985) provided evidence
on the effectiveness of the corporate governance reform movement in suggesting a
positive relationship among the proportion of independent directors and company
performance.
Chilean Corporate Law 18,046 requires the separation of the CEO and chair of the
board. A mandatory independent board member is required for listed companies, but
only if the listed equity is above 1,500,000 UFs (from its Spanish acronym of
Unidades de Fomento)7 and at least 12.5% of its shares with voting rights are owned
by shareholders who do not individually own or control more than 10.0% of
such shares.
The Code of Good Governance in Spain states that when the chair of the board is
also a company executive, additional powers should be given to the lead independent
director. It recommends at least half of the directors in the boardroom be independ-
ent, but at the same time establishes that when the percentage is excessive in some
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cases, the threshold recommendation decreases to one third of board members.
Independent directors in Chile represented 17.3% of the total for 2016, whilst in the
international arena this ratio represented almost 29.0% of total directors. In the case
of Spain, independent directors represented 44.0% of the total for 2016.
Both countries have included in their regulations requirements in favour of
increasing independent board members for efficiency. As recently stated by Uribe-
Bohorquez, Martınez-Ferrero, and Garcıa-Sanchez (2019), the moderating role of
institutional factors, such as regulatory requirements, have a significant and positive
impact on board features in improving firms’ efficiency. Based on these arguments,
we suggest the following hypothesis:
H5: Ceteris paribus, a greater proportion of independent directors on the boards of
Chilean and Spanish companies will impact positively a firm’s value.
3. Methodology design
3.1. Econometric strategy
Our goal in this part of the study is to assess to what extent and direction the gov-
ernance systems impact the firm value in the sample of Chilean and Spanish compa-
nies. The drivers of firm value are measured at the company level and at the
institutional level to control for those factors that may cause an asymmetric impact
on firm value because of the characteristics of the institutional and legal systems in
both countries. The first part of the empirical analysis is focused on a univariate ana-
lysis that describes the behaviour of each variable. The second part develops the
multi-variate analysis through panel data technique.
Panel data analysis allows us to tackle individual heterogeneity issues typically
observed in the literature. Gormley and Matsa (2014) stated that controlling for
unobserved heterogeneity is fundamental in empirical finance research, because
asset prices and most corporate policies depend on factors that are unobservable
to the econometrician but must be considered in the analysis. Constant and unob-
servable heterogeneity refers to specific factors of each firm that remain constant
over time (e.g., differences in local economic environments, management quality,
attitude toward risk, and internal policies, to name a few). If these factors are cor-
related with the variables of interest, results can lead to biased estimations of
parameters if the individual and unobservable effect is not properly treated.
The other econometric caveat widely recognised in the literature is the endogeneity
problem (Arellano, 2002; Roberts & Whited, 2013). This problem takes place when
there is not a clear direction of the causality between the corporate governance sys-
tems and the proxies of firm value (Wintoki, Linck, & Netter, 2012). Hence, it is
expected that this simultaneity problem may cause biases in the predictions (Brown,
Beekes, & Verhoeven, 2011). Consequently, when the endogeneity issue is ignored,
results are at the very least incomplete.
The two-stage Generalised Method of Moments System Estimator (GMM-SE) is a
superior technique that controls for both econometric problems by using as instru-
ments the lagged right-hand-side variables in the model (Alonso-Borrego & Arellano,
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1999). Alternatively, the unobservable fixed-effect method is also used for robustness
purposes as a second order method, although the results are not reported.
The consistency of the estimates depends critically on the absence of second-order
serial autocorrelation and on the validity of the instruments. To deal with these con-
ditions, the AR(2) test is used to measure the second-order serial correlation, and the
Hansen (1982) contrast of over-identified restrictions is used to check if the instru-
ments are exogenously determined. Additionally, we used the Wald test of joint sig-
nificance for all independent variables and test the potential multicollinearity
problems through the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF). Finally, in order to test the
inverse U-shaped relationships suggested in the first two research hypotheses, the
appropriate Lind and Mehlum (2010) test is used.
In addition to the advantages of the panel data technique mentioned above, it
allows us to gain higher informative content than cross sectional analysis as a conse-
quence of the simultaneous use of time series and cross-sections. It also allows higher
variability, lower collinearity among explicative variables, more degrees of freedom,
and higher efficiency (Baltagi, 2013).
3.2. Sample of firms and source of information
The study is performed with information of a sample of Chilean and Spanish listed
companies in their respective exchanges. The financial information and information
concerning the ownership structure features were obtained from Thomson Reuters
EIKON from 2007 to 2016. Given their regulated status and different financial report-
ing system, financial institutions were excluded from the sample. The advantage of
the Thomson Reuters EIKON is that it has homogenised data and enables compari-
son and analytical work of data obtained from both countries under analysis. Board
feature variables were obtained from the Bloomberg data set in the case of Spain and
manually collected from the firms’ annual reports in the case of Chile.
The composition of the panel data by country is described in Table 1. To compose
an efficient panel of data, we included a minimum of five continuous year observa-
tions per firm with an average of 7.09. The total sample includes 1060 observations
for Chilean companies and 845 for Spanish companies.
Regarding the contextual variables, we used the Economic Freedom Index of the
Heritage Foundation and the Global Gender Gap Index sourced by the World
Economic Forum. Both indexes are publicly available.
3.3. Variable definition
3.3.1. Dependent variable: firm value
Given that firm value is estimated, several alternative proxies are used to provide
robustness to the results. Tobin’s Q is a variable widely used in the literature as a
proxy for firm value (Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001; Jara, Lopez-Iturriaga, San-Martın,
& Saona, 2018). It is defined as the market value of equity plus the book value of
total debt over the book value of total assets ðFV1Þ: In this case, total debt is meas-
ured as the short- and long-term interest-bearing debt related to operating activities
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(with no consideration of other sources of debt such as accruals, accounts payable,
etc.). Alternatively, we use an adjusted measure of Tobin’s Q ðFV2Þ variable that con-
siders only in the nominator the book value of total short- and long-term liabilities,
defined as the market value of equity plus the book value of total liabilities over the
book value of total assets. The market to book ratio is also used as a measure of firm
value ðFV3Þ, and finally, we follow a similar approach to Lopez and Crisostomo
(2010) and calculate a sector-adjusted Tobin’s Q ratio ðFV4Þ: Given the literature
has underlined the influence of some sectorial issues on this variable, such as sector-
specific patterns of tangible to non-tangible assets, risk, and growth, among others,
we believe it is suitable to consider a sector-adjusted version of the dependent vari-
able. This is computed as the difference between a firm’s FV2 variable and its mean
value for the firms operating in the same sector, year, and country.8
3.3.2. Corporate governance variables
Two variables were used to measure the ownership structure features. Concentration
ðConc1Þ, corresponding to the proportion of outstanding shares in the portfolio of
the majority shareholder, representing their voting rights; and the percentage of
closely held shares PCHShð Þ, which corresponds to the proportion of shares in the
portfolio of managers, directors, controlling shareholders, holding groups, and any
stakeholder of reference who, though not having executive responsibilities, holds a
certain level of power in the most important corporate decisions.
Concerning the variables that measure the board of directors’ features, board size
ðBSizeÞ was computed as the number of members sitting in the board of directors
(Nguyen et al., 2016), and board gender diversity was measured as the share of
women on the board relative to the total number of board members ðBGD1Þ:
Additionally, in order to increase the heterogeneity in this variable, we follow Martın-
Ugedo and Minguez-Vera (2014) and Abad, Lucas-Perez, Minguez-Vera, and Yag€ue
(2017) and use two additional indexed measures of gender diversity that consider the
proportion of the relative weights of both genders in the board. Hence, we define
BGD2 as 1Pni¼1 P2i , where Pi corresponds to the proportion of directors in each
n ¼ 2 gender categories (male and female members). By construction, this indicator
ranges between 0 when there is no gender diversity at all (e.g., there are only male
members or female members in the board); and 0.5 when there is an equal propor-
tion of male and female members on the board.9 The third indicator used to measure
Table 1. Panel composition.
Year Chile (%) Spain (%) Total
2007 39 3.68 73 8.64 112
2008 37 3.49 76 8.99 113
2009 38 3.58 80 9.47 118
2010 108 10.19 81 9.59 189
2011 108 10.19 84 9.94 192
2012 137 12.92 83 9.82 220
2013 153 14.43 85 10.06 238
2014 149 14.06 86 10.18 235
2015 148 13.96 94 11.12 242
2016 143 13.49 103 12.19 246
Total 1060 100.00 845 100.00 1905
Notes: This table shows the number of firms by country and year to compound the panel data.
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: Similar to BGD2, this indicator
takes values between 0, when there is no gender diversification, and 0.693, when there
is an equal proportion of each gender category.10 Board independence ðBIndepÞ was
calculated as the proportion of independent members in the boardroom.
At the institutional level, two variables were employed. The first one is the Global
Gender Gap Index ðGGGÞ, published annually by the World Economic Forum and
defined as the indicator that ranks countries according to calculated gender gap
between women and men in four key areas: health, education, economy, and politics
in order to gauge the state of gender equality in a country. The highest possible score
for this indicator is 1 when equality or better for women is observed, and 0 when the
maximum disparity exists between genders. Our second measure at the institutional
level is the Economic Freedom Index ðEFIÞ of the Heritage Foundation. It corre-
sponds to an indicator based upon twelve quantitative and qualitative factors,
grouped into the following four broad categories of economic freedom: rule of law,
government size, regulatory efficiency, and open markets. Each of these categories is
graded on a scale of 0 to 100, and a country’s overall index is derived by averaging
the scores. The greater the value, the better the economic freedom and consequently
its underlying categories.
3.3.3. Control variables
In order to reduce biases in the estimations as a consequence of sub-identification, a
number of control variables were included in the models such as the firm size ðSizeÞ,
leverage ðLevÞ, profitability ðROAÞ, collateral capacity ðTangÞ and firm’s default risk
ðRiskÞ: Size was computed as the natural logarithm of the firm’s total assets (San
Martın & Saona, 2017); Lev corresponded to the ratio of total short- and long-term
interest-bearing debt over firm’s total assets. ROA was computed as the net income
over total assets; Tang, as the firm’s net property, plant, and equipment over total
assets (Saona & San Martın, 2018); and Risk variable was measured based on the
Altman (1968)’s Z-Score as 1:2WKTAþ 1:4 RE þ 3:3 EBITTA þ 0:6 
MKTTLþ 1:0 RTA, where WKTA is the working capital over total assets, RE is
the retained earnings over total assets, EBITTA is the annual earnings before interests
and taxes over total assets, MKTTL is defined as the firms’ market capitalisation over
total liabilities, and RTA is the total revenues over total assets. Finally, industry dum-
mies as well as temporal and country dummy variables entered the specifications.
Hence, the full regression model is:
FVitc ¼ b0 þ b1BGDitc þ b2BSizeitc þ b3BIndepitc þ b4OWNitc þ b5GGGtc
þ b6EFItc þ b7Sizeitc þ b8Levitc þ b9ROAitc þ b10Tangitc þ b11Riskitc
þ b12IndustryDummyict þ b13TimeDummyt þ b14CountryDummyc þ li þ rt þ eit
(1)
Where FV represents the alternative measures of firm value as dependent variable;
BGD, the gender diversity in the board of directors; OWN, the different measures
used for ownership structure features; and l, r, and e are the individual effect, tem-
poral effect, and the stochastic error in the estimations, for the i firm, in the t period,
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and c country. All the other variables are defined above. Finally, in order to test the
hypotheses that suggest non-linear relationships with firm value, the quadratic form
of the respective variables are entered in the estimations–in this case, Conc12
and PCHSh2:
4. Interpretation of results
4.1. Univariate analysis
This section describes the general characteristics of the main variables used in this
study. From Table 2 we can derive the following observations. First, the main values
of all the alternative proxy measures of firm value exhibit how overpriced firm value
is in both countries (e.g., see the mean values for the entire sample and by country
for variables FV1, FV2, FV3, and FV4). Second, board gender diversity ðBGD1Þ
shows that there is a relatively low female presence on boards amounting to 7.4% of
the total board members as compared to countries such as Denmark, Finland,
France, or Norway which hold 9.8%, 19.2%, 11.2%, and 29.2% of women on boards,
as stated by Kyaw, Olugbode, and Petracci (2015). In fact, the three variables used to
measure board gender diversity describe that in all the cases men are in the majority.
BGD2 and BGD3, which correspond to the Blau and Shannon Indexes, indicate that
there is a no balanced gender diversity on boards. Third, the average board size
ðBSizeÞ corresponds to 8.7 members with 22.0% of independent members ðBIndepÞ:
Fourth, the top shareholder holds about 38.2% of the voting rights. In comparison to
Anglo-Saxon economies, for instance, this percentage is only 3.1% in the case of the
majority shareholders in New Zealand companies according to Gaur et al. (2015), or
the distribution of the ownership rights among the five largest shareholders which is
just 22.3% in US companies, as described by Richter and Weiss (2013). Fifth, the typ-
ical company analysed in this study finances its total assets with about 27.3% debt
Levð Þ–which is comparable with the average value reported by Saona, San Martın,
and Jara (2018) for Chilean companies (23.6%) or by Azofra, Saona, and Vallelado
(2007) for Spanish firms (30.0%). Moreover, the typical company in the sample has
a 3.1% profitability ratio ROAð Þ, and its fixed assets represent 37.9% of total
assets Tangð Þ:
We used the mean difference test to compare average values per variable for the two
countries under analysis, as reported in the final column in Table 2. From this compari-
son, the following observations are identified. First, concerning the alternative measures
of firm value, Spanish companies exhibit statistically higher valuation than Chilean com-
panies, at least in FV2 and FV3 variables. Second, board features show that average
Spanish companies have larger boards, with a greater proportion of independent directors
and are more gender balanced. It is plausible that the contextual influence of the culture
and legal structure reveals these differences in the board characteristics between Chile and
Spain. Hence, it seems that Spanish boards of directors are more aligned with the general
guidelines suggested by the codes of good governance than Chilean firms (Garcıa Martın
& Herrero, 2018). Third, the results show that Spanish firms systematically have less con-
centrated ownership structures than Chilean companies. This preliminary finding is stat-
istically significant under all different measures of ownership structure (see Conc1 and
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PCHSh in Table 2). Literature has suggested that the legal protection encourages compa-
nies to have concentrated ownership structures to mitigate the potential risks of weak
monitoring (Saona et al., 2018).
Regarding the two contextual variables used in this study, we observe that the
average Economic Freedom Index EFIð Þ is around 73, knowing that this variable goes
from 4.9 to 79 with higher values as economic freedom increases. Results in Table 2
highlight the fact that the Chilean economy has experienced a process of deregulation
and economic openness at an international level, first under the administration of
president Pinochet and then after the update and amendments of numerous laws that
regulate capital markets and the market for traded goods in the subsequent adminis-
trations. In comparison to Spain (68.43), the economic freedom is greater in Chile
(78.12). A quick look at the Chilean corporate sector reveals the high participation of
both foreign firms and capital operating in the country (Saona & San Martın, 2018).
The second country-level variable used in the empirical analysis is the Global Gender
Gap GGGð Þ, which exhibited average values 0.69 and 0.74 of Chile and Spain. This
indicates that higher gender parity exists in Spain than in Chile. This indicator is also
aligned with our previous description of the board gender diversity measures for
both countries.




DifferenceMean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Mean
FV1 1810 1.195 1.663 0.156 17.587 1.1872 1.2033 0.0162
FV2 1810 1.431 1.209 0.257 9.336 1.3472 1.5252 0.1780
FV3 1770 2.269 3.072 0.016 19.439 1.8326 2.7756 0.9430
FV4 1810 0.072 1.563 2.314 14.104 0.0927 0.0489 0.0438
BGD1 2028 0.074 0.103 0.000 0.600 0.0424 0.1126 0.0702
BGD2 2028 0.116 0.148 0.000 0.496 0.0655 0.1775 0.1120
BGD3 2028 0.188 0.228 0.000 0.689 0.1047 0.2871 0.1824
BSize 2008 8.777 3.183 4.000 24.000 7.2134 10.6222 3.4087
BIndep 2028 0.227 0.202 0.000 1.000 0.1173 0.3586 0.2413
Conc1 1904 0.382 0.259 0.000 0.999 0.4638 0.2803 0.1835
Conc12 1904 0.213 0.246 0.000 0.999 0.2798 0.1299 0.1499
PCHSh 1771 0.592 0.292 0.000 1.000 0.7076 0.4391 0.2685
PCHSh2 1771 0.436 0.320 0.000 1.000 0.5719 0.2551 0.3167
EFI 2028 73.721 4.979 63.600 79.000 78.1234 68.4286 9.6948
GGG 1956 0.711 0.028 0.648 0.758 0.6896 0.7386 0.0490
Size 1963 20.052 2.230 12.870 25.589 19.4649 20.8071 1.3422
Lev 1947 0.273 0.184 0.000 0.976 0.2296 0.3285 0.0988
ROA 1962 0.031 0.094 0.415 0.460 0.0395 0.0200 0.0195
Tang 1962 0.379 0.250 0.000 1.000 0.4405 0.2995 0.1409
Risk 1791 2.545 2.894 1.268 21.227 2.7986 2.2614 0.5372
Notes: The table shows the mean, the standard deviation and the minimum and maximum for the total sample vari-
ables; as well as the mean by country. Four metrics are used for firm value. FV1 defined as the market value of
equity plus the book value of total debt over the book value of total assets, FV2 measured as adjusted measure of
Tobin’s Q, FV3 which iscalculated as the market to book ratio, and FV4 is calculated as the sector-adjusted Tobin’s Q
ratio. Board gender diversity was measured as the share of women on the board relative to the total number of
board members BGD1ð Þ; BGD2 and BGD3 also measure gender diversity according to the Blau and Shannon indexes.
Board size ðBSizeÞ is the number of members sitting in the board of directors and board independence (BIndeep) is
the proportion of independent board members. Conc1 is proportion of outstanding shares in the portfolio of the
majority shareholder and PCHSh is the closely held shares, corresponding to the proportion of shares in the portfolio
of managers, directors, controlling shareholder, holding groups, and any stakeholder of reference that although does
not have executive responsibilities, holds certain level of power in the most important corporate decisions. At insti-
tutional level, we use the Global Gender Gap Index (GGG) and the Economic Freedom Index (EFI). Firm size ðSizeÞ,
leverage ðLevÞ, profitability ðROAÞ, collateral capacity ðTangÞ and firm’s default risk ðRiskÞ are control variables.
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4.2. Multivariate analysis
As mentioned above, the generalised method of moment with the system estimator
(GMM-SE) is used as econometric technique to test our research hypotheses.
Tables 3 through 5 display the results of Equation (1). These tables include a set of
several proxies of firm value.11 Table 3 shows the results of the baseline model using
temporal and country fixed effects. Time fixed-effect accounts for unobservable
changes over time, and country fixed effects accounts for unobserved differences per
country in the sample. The eight regressions are grouped based on the four alterna-
tive dependent variables.
In Table 3, we observe that there is a U-shaped effect of the ownership concentra-
tion Conc1ð Þ on firm value, which is robust across the first four specifications. This is
an unexpected result because our hypotheses suggested an inverse U-shaped relation-
ship, in line with the monitoring and expropriation approach. This indicates that in
early stages of concentration the effect is that it erodes the value of the company as a
result of the wealth expropriation of minority shareholders by the controlling one. It
seems to be that ownership concentration as a governance device is not efficient
enough to maximise the value of all existing shareholders. Apparently, the market
penalises low levels of concentration, and this eventually diminishes firm value. This
result, however, may be consistent with, for example, the La Polar case in Chile,
where the lack of a controlling shareholder allowed the accounting manipulation
strategies carried out by the company’s managers.
The regression outputs allow us to estimate the critical point at which firm value
is minimised (given the U-shaped relationship between the ownership concentration
and firm value). As observed in Table 3, the critical values averaged 44.2% of voting
rights of the majority shareholder, meaning that at levels of concentration below this,
firm value is reduced and at levels higher than that, firm value is increased as owner-
ship gets more concentrated. When looking at the average ownership concentration
per country (see Table 2), we observe that a typical Chilean firm is operating at a
level of concentration that supports the alignment of interest hypothesis, whilst
Spanish firms are operating with a concentration of ownership in hand of the major-
ity shareholder at a level that destroys value.
Regarding the other governance variables, it is possible to verify that the board of
directors is an efficient internal governance system. The size of the board, the propor-
tion of independent directors, as well as the increased presence of female directors
have a positive influence on the value of the company. This would indicate that for
both countries, these corporate governance mechanisms are valuable, and the market
rewards companies whose boards are larger, with a higher proportion of independent
directors and more gender diversity. At the institutional level, our two variables
ðGGG and EFIÞ are positively related to firm value. This means that the institutional
support in both countries gives guarantees that allow, on the one hand, greater legal
protection to the investor and, on the other hand, to ensure a better functioning of
the market that eventually triggers firm value.
The control variables exhibit a behaviour in accordance to previous researches.
Size has a negative effect on firm value. Leverage, profitability, and risk positively
affect the market valuation of the firm.
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In Table 4 we also find partial evidence of an inverse U-shaped relationship
between insiders’ ownership PCHShð Þ and firm value according to the fifth and
eighth columns that include FV1 and FV4 as dependent variables. The average of
these critical values is 33.2% and indicates that when insiders control less than that
percentage, the value of the firm increases as a result of the convergence effect
hypothesis. When insiders control more than 33.2% of the outstanding shares, it
tends to destroy value for the company because of the expropriation effect hypothesis.
Column number 6 in Table 3 reports a critical value which is out of range and conse-
quently, its U-shaped form is trivially rejected. The only dissonant finding regarding
PCHSh variable is observed in the seventh regression of Table 3, which contradicts
our research hypothesis of an inverse U-shaped association between insiders’ owner-
ship and firm value.
Although concentrated ownership in some civil-law contexts, and particularly in
Latin-American countries like Chile, has surged as a response to the lack of efficient
governance, our findings seem to show that the market assigns a premium for high
levels of ownership concentration and this increases the value of the company. From
the market perspective, the results demonstrate that the vertical agency problem is
relevant and penalises low levels of concentration and rewards the opposite.
Consequently, we reject the hypothesis H1 that supported an inverse non-monotonic
relationship between ownership concentration and firm value.
Regarding the directorship features, consistent with the monitoring role of the
board, and in line with the third of the research hypotheses, our results exhibit a con-
sistent, statistically significant and positive relationship between the board size ðBSizeÞ
and firm valuation. This result could be interpreted as the larger the size of the
board, the more superior the quality of the decisions, and the higher valuation (Farag
& Mallin, 2019). The average of the coefficients of the specifications (1) through (8)
(except 7) indicates an elasticity of 0.0667, which implies when board size increases
by 10.0%, firm value increases 6.7%.
Considering the proportion of independent directors BIndepð Þ as a more effect-
ive way of monitoring, our findings reveal that a greater degree of independence
of the boardroom implies greater efficiency in the supervisory role towards senior
management, which translates into fewer conflicts of interest, and therefore gener-
ates an increase in the value of the company (Coles & Hesterly, 2000; Dalton &
Dalton, 2005; Setia-Atmaja, 2009). Considering the independence of the board as a
governance system, the results confirm the effectiveness of this mechanism. With
it, our results are consistent and statistically significant with the fourth
research hypothesis.
In six out of eight specifications, the results confirm the benefit of having a higher
proportion of women ðBGD1Þ on the company’s board of directors. Women have
unique characteristics regarding business ethics and risk aversion. Our findings are
consistent with previous research that reveals that women have higher levels of
motivation and achievement, moral values, social stereotypes, and the relation
between task performance and self-confidence, which, at the end of the day, foster a
positive and significant correlation with the value of the firm (Gul et al., 2009;
Srinidhi et al., 2011).
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At country-level variables, and apart from regressions (4) and (8), the results indi-
cate that the better the position in terms of gender parity–measured through the
Global Gender Gap, GGG–the higher will be the value of the company. And regard-
ing the Economic Freedom Index EFIð Þ, although with less statistical power than in
the case of the GGG, we observe a positive correlation between economic freedom
and firm value. These results corroborate the relevance of having a more developed
market, which improves the economic freedom and gender equity.
Considering our control variables, the results are presented in line with the general
intuition and with those obtained by previous works. The greater the size of the com-
pany Sizeð Þ, the greater the level of tangible assets Tangð Þ, and the greater the risk
Riskð Þ, the lower the value of the firm. On the contrary, higher levels of indebtedness
Levð Þ and profitability ROAð Þ lead to higher company value.
Finally, and related to the country dummy, the results are not conclusive.
However, Table 5 allows an analysis to be carried out that will make it possible to
differentiate between the countries analysed.
Table 4 reports as dependent variables the Tobin’s Q FV1ð Þ and the sector-
adjusted Tobin’s Q FV4ð Þ because they were found the most significant variables and
because they are the most popular measures of firm value.12 This table includes the
two alternative proxies for gender diversity (BGD2 and BGD3) which refer to the pre-
viously mentioned gender diversity Blau Index and Shannon Index. In general, the
results confirm the previous findings. Both, Blau and Shannon Indexes reveal that
gender diversity is important for the market and that investors are willing to pay a
premium for firms with gender-balanced boards.
Finally, Table 5 exhibits the results of ownership concentration and board compos-
ition and their impact on firm value but considers differences between countries.
These specifications include an interacted dummy variable that takes value 1 if the
country is Chile and 0 for Spain.
When the measure of the voting rights of the majority shareholder is considered
Conc1ð Þ, it is observed that it is statistically significant only in the specifications (5)
and (7). But the results, differing from the previous findings, are not conclusive. In
the case of insider ownership PCHShð Þ, the results evidence a negative and statistic-
ally significant effect on firm value in the case of Spanish companies as observed in
specifications (2) and (4). For Chilean companies, however, the results (the sum of
the coefficients of PCHSh and PCHSh  CountryÞ indicate that the effect is positive,13
as observed in the specifications (2), (4), (6), and (8) in Table 5.
Table 3 exhibits a positive effect of the board size on firm value for the over-
all sample. Now, in Table 5 the results show that this effect is connected mainly
to the Spanish companies. The coefficient of board size BSizeð Þ for the Chilean
companies (the sum of the coefficients of BSize and BSize  CountryÞ is
inconclusive.
When board independence is considered, we observe that the effect is positive on
the value of the Spanish firm. As mentioned above, the greater the proportion of
independent directors, the greater the firm value. This result, interesting and worth
considering, is consistent among all specifications and illustrates that independence of
the members of the board is an effective mechanism of corporate governance in
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Spain. However, for Chilean firms, the results are less favourable and consistent. In
fact, in some regressions the impact of directorship independency is negative.
The case of board gender diversity appears to be less significant and weakly rele-
vant in Spain. In fact, the coefficient of BGD1 is not statistically significant in some
specifications and is negative in some others. Nevertheless, the assessment of the
effect of a gender-balanced board is more appealing in the case of Chilean companies,
where the impact of a higher proportion of women on the board is systematically
positive and significant. Differing from the Spanish context, in Chile, the laws and
their enforcement as well as corporate governance recommendations are still in a pre-
mature stage of development and, consequently, any small advancement in this
respect causes an exponential impact on firm value. In Spain, however, the market
assumes women board members as more natural and consequently their presence in
this governance structure does not cause a substantial impact on the firm value.
Incorporating a country dummy variable as an interacted variable has been utilised
significantly in highlighting the differences in the application of governance practices
between both countries. The whole sample is less efficient in capturing the contextual
impacts on firm value. Both countries belong to different economic, legal, and cul-
tural contexts, and the analysis through the interacted variables has shed some light
on the asymmetrical impact of ownership and board structures on firm value.
5. Conclusions
The goal of this paper is to analyse the potential impact that ownership structure and
board characteristics, as corporate governance mechanisms, have on corporate value
in the context of Chile and Spain. Our main findings exhibit that firm-level corporate
governance features directly impact firm value and are powerful instruments to
improve firm performance.
Relative to previous literature, this paper uses a unique data set from Chile and
Spain to provide new evidence concerning the drivers of firm value in the Ibero-
American context. Our findings show that ownership structure, as a corporate gov-
ernance feature, continues to be a key mechanism in influencing firm value.
Our findings confirm that shares in the hands of the major shareholder affect firm
value in a non-linear way. Contrary to expectation, we do not find clear evidence of
an inverse U-shaped effect of ownership concentration over firm value for the overall
sample of firms. The tendency is a U-shaped impact, indicating that the market
penalises companies with low controlling ownership. When controlling ownership
exceeds a certain level, the market seems to reward it, in an (assumed) attempt to
avoid the vertical-type agency problems which are prevalent in civil-law countries
(e.g., La Polar scandal in Chile). We have found that Chile, in general, has increased
its level of ownership concentration in response to weak governance; in Spain the dis-
tance to the critical value evidences a stage of loss in value creation. Consequently,
policy makers and authorities in the Spanish scenario are recommended to focus on
developing strategies to foster governance systems that prevent expropriation of
minority shareholders’ wealth. As emphasised by Rapp and Trinchera (2017), Spain
presents one of the weakest country-level shareholder protections among European
ECONOMIC RESEARCH-EKONOMSKA ISTRAŽIVANJA 2161
economies. Hence, these findings allow us to recommend the promotion of control
and regulation of self-dealing transactions by corporate insiders. Measures like this
would help to protect small shareholders against self-interested, majority sharehold-
ers. Similarly, regulation in Spain can be extended towards mandatory rather than
just recommended corporate actions to guard shareholder rights. For instance, the
possibility to mail proxy votes can be legislated. Another example might be to grant
rights regarding the minimum percentage of votes needed to call an extraordinary
shareholder meeting as drivers of the minority shareholder protection.
When it comes to the shares in hands of the insiders, the situation changes
slightly. Evidence shows that insider ownership impacts firm value in an inverse
U-shaped way, giving support to the hypotheses of alignment and entrenchment
effect. But the results show also differences between both countries: companies in
Spain penalise firm value at an average level of insiders’ ownership, whereas Chilean
companies reward it.
The board of directors also presents differences between countries. Even though
Chile is the country with less independent and female members in the boards, the
results show that the impact of these features on firm value is greater there than in
Spain. It seems to be that when laws and rules are properly enforced, it is less relevant
to have more independent and gender-diverse boards. In Chile, a positive effect is
observed on the value of companies when boards are larger, more independent, and
gender balanced. It is also important to highlight that firm value in Spanish corpora-
tions is more positively affected by changes in independent directors than in Chile.
Regarding additional implications and policy recommendations, we state that it is
necessary to consider the particularities of countries in the region when examining
the corporate governance and its impact on financial decisions. The widespread intu-
ition that a one-size-fits-all theoretical approach is inaccurate when studying compa-
nies of institutional contexts other than the Anglo-Saxon one. Additionally, our
findings indicate that countries must work to improve their legal settings in order to
better protect shareholders other than the controlling one, and especially minority
shareholders. Even though Spanish boards of directors seem to be more aligned than
Chilean boards with the guidelines of corporate governance codes, in terms of size,
independence and gender diversity (Garcıa Martın & Herrero, 2018), there is still
work to be done for both countries with regard to enhancing firm value and reducing
managerial misbehaviour. More specifically, both countries should promote more
female presence in boards of directors and in managerial positions. As we have
shown in this study, women in corporate positions promote firm value. In this sense,
Chile could become the pioneer country in Latin America to adopt regulation
towards increasing the presence of female board members not only as a matter of
improving corporate governance but also as a matter of justice and equality between
men and women as internationally stablished (Abad et al., 2017). Similarly, Spain
could follow European trends towards mandatory quota systems as recently proven
efficient in reducing agency conflicts and asymmetries of information (Saona, Muro,
San Martın, & Baier, 2019).
Finally, we must recognise the inherent limitations of our study. First, we only
focused on some ownership structure features as determinants of firm value in both
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countries. Nevertheless, there are so many other angles of the corporate ownership
structure that might trigger changes in firm value. For instance, it has been widely
discussed in the literature the effect of business group affiliation to shape the govern-
ance systems and leverage market power in civil-law economies. Our study, however,
remains silent in this respect and leaves this characteristic of the ownership structure
as a future research line. Second, and also regarding the ownership structure, our
study provides limited conclusions concerning the nature of the controlling share-
holder, as with state-owned firms, foreign firms, or institutional investors that might
exhibit asymmetric interests regarding the way to maximise the value of the firm.
This point is also very appealing and might provide useful insights in further
research. Third, given that this study is only focused on two economies, its major
conclusions might not be extrapolated to a broader context of civil-law countries.
Hence, the incorporation of more countries to the firms’ sample can provide much
better and more precise findings and policy implications.
Concerning the methodology, it also has certain limitations in the measurement
errors of proxies for the variables of interest. For instance, although we used four
alternative measures of firm value as the dependent variable and the results exhibited
a high degree of robustness, we still have minor concerns in the construction of this
variable. For example, in order to calculate the metric for firm value we implicitly
assumed that the inputs needed in its computation are homogeneous across the com-
panies in the sample. However, such magnitudes might differ across companies and
across countries as a consequence of unobservable features such as particularities in
specific industries, internal company policies, or certain characteristics in the institu-
tional systems of the countries that might not be necessarily recorded in our control
variables. Further developments in the base line methodology might alleviate these
limitations but are left to future research.
Notes
1. G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance. http://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/principles-
corporate-governance.htm
2. The Commission for the Financial Market (ex-SVS) is the supervisory authority that
keeps a strict register of all business groups in Chile.
3. Different from other empirical works such as Garcıa Martın and Herrero (2018), this
paper analyses Chile and Spain over a longer time span (from 2007 to 2016).
4. https://globaledge.msu.edu/countries/chile/tradestats
5. G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance. https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/
9789264236882-en.pdf?expires=1526903754&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=31A837CF
16FA51157AB4DDC9415F99BA
6. A peculiar situation is observed in China in which listed companies account with a two-
tier board comprised by a supervisory board and a board of directors (Farag & Mallin,
2019). In this case, the supervisory board is entitled to monitor and supervise the actions
and decisions made by the board of directors and the company’s CEO. This dual
governance mechanism is intended to enhance corporate governance and both boards are
required to report to shareholders on their actions.
7. UF is an inflation-linked unit of account that is used in Chile. The exchange rate
between the UF and the Chilean peso is continually adjusted for inflation so that the
value of the Unidad de Fomento remains almost constant on a daily basis during low
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inflation. This unit of accounting is typically used in transactions that involve large
amounts of money (e.g., the real-estate market).
8. From a theoretical point of view, Tobin’s Q coefficient is the ratio defined as market
value of the firm to replacement cost of assets (Chung & Pruitt, 1994). Although not
reported, it was also used in the empirical analysis a variable for the Tobin’s Q that
employs a proxy for the replacement cost of assets based on Perfect and Wiles (1994).
Though the results with this variable were qualitatively like those reported with FV1,
FV2, FV3, and FV4, they were not reported given a lack of significance. As an
informative fact, the correlation between the Tobin’s Q variable that employs a proxy for
the replacement cost of assets and FV1, FV2, FV3, and FV4 was 0.93, 0.92, 0.74,
and 0.85.
9. This indicator is also known in the literature as the Blau (1977) Index.
10. This indicator is also known in the literature as Shannon (1948) and assumes that
BGD3 ¼ 0 when Pi ¼ 0: According to Abad et al. (2017), GD3 is more sensitive to small
changes in gender diversity that BGD2 due to its logarithmic transformation.
11. Alternatively to the four measures based on the Tobin’s Q of the dependent variable used
in this study (FV1, FV2, FV3, and FV4), we followed Perfect and Wiles (1994) and
used an estimation of the Tobin’s Q which considers the replacement cost of total assets.
Moreover, the capital expenditure over the one-period lagged net property, plant, and
equipment was also used as a proxy for value creation. In addition to this, the ownership
concentration was also measured as the proportion of the shares outstanding in the
portfolios of the second, third, and the sum of the three largest shareholders. In all the
cases, these variables reported comparable results to those exhibited in this study.
12. Nevertheless, the other firm value proxies were used in the estimations but not reported
for space-saving reasons. In general, the results are qualitatively like those reported in
Table 4 and are available upon request to the corresponding author.
13. For example, in regression (2) Table 5, the effect is 0.3460 (¼ 0.3395þ 0.6855) which
confirms the positive effect of insider ownership over firm value, corroborating the
previous evidence observed for Chilean companies.
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